# **SILHOUETTE PREVENT POLICY**

**1. Introduction**

1.1 The current threat from terrorism in the United Kingdom is real and severe and can involve the exploitation of vulnerable people, including children, young people and adults to engage them in terrorism or activity in support of terrorism. Silhouette Youth has adopted elements of our policy on this issues from a variety of local authority guidance on the Prevent policy and procedure.

1.2 The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 created a legal duty (the “Prevent Duty”) for ‘specified authorities’ (including local authorities; further and higher educational establishments; schools; registered childcare providers; NHS Trusts; prisons; probation services; police; and, under-18 secure estates) to have ‘due regard’, in the exercise of their functions to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism.

1.3 There is an associated legal duty (the “Channel Duty”) for local authorities and other partners to provide support for people who are vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. The process through which this is undertaken is known as Channel.

1.4 Peshkar agrees that exploitation of individuals by drawing them into terrorism or extremism leading to terrorism should be viewed as a safeguarding concern, and should be embedded into the work of local Children’s Services and Adult Services departments.

1.5 Silhouette Youth understands and works within these principles to ensure that children and young people are safeguarded.

1.6 Your Local Authority safeguarding arrangements for preventing involvement in terrorism or extremism leading to terrorism are aligned with existing safeguarding arrangements for children and vulnerable adults. Channel is embedded within these and in doing so, takes account of and complies with the requirements of the statutory duty.

1.7 This guidance is designed to provide a clear framework with which to respond to safeguarding concerns for those children, young people and adults who may be at risk of being drawn into terrorism, or extremism leading to terrorism.

1.8 The Policy includes the linkage between safeguarding procedures and the Channel process. This provides a mechanism for supporting those who may be vulnerable to violent extremism by assessing the nature and the extent of the potential risk and, where necessary, providing an appropriate support package.

1.9 This framework is underpinned by a number of key principles:

• safeguarding to protect individuals from extremist or violent views operates under the same principles as safeguarding them from other forms of significant harm such as physical, emotional or sexual abuse, or neglect;

• each vulnerable child, young person or adult is unique, is vulnerable for unique reasons and needs an individualised response;

• each vulnerable child, young person or adult affects, and is affected by, multiple domains of influence - i.e. their family, the community in which they live, wider society;

• Silhouette Youth and its partners have a duty to respond promptly and robustly to concerns raised around possible safeguarding issues.

* information will be shared between organisations as appropriate in the interests of protecting a child, young person or adult from serious harm;

• this is a collaborative process to enable effective integrated working to improve outcomes for children, young people and adults, arising from a common or specialist assessment.

**2. Legislative and Policy Information**

**2.1** The following legislation and policies have provided the framework for this safeguarding protocol:

• The Children Act 1989; as revised by the Children Act 2004;

• Working Together to Safeguard Children: a guide to inter-agency working to safeguard and promote the welfare of children, Department for Children, Schools and Families 2015;

• Framework for the Assessment of Children in Need and their Families, Department of Health 2000;

• The Care Act 2014;

• Mental Capacity Act 2005;

• Mental Capacity Act Code of Practice, Department of Constitutional Affairs 2007;

• The Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004;

• The CONTEST (Counter-Terrorism) Strategy 2011;

• Prevent Strategy 2011;

• Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015;

• Revised Prevent Duty Guidance: Guidance for specified authorities in England and Wales on the duty in the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism;

• Channel Duty Guidance: Protecting vulnerable people from being drawn into terrorism. Statutory guidance for Channel panel members and partners of local panels, 2015.

**2.2 Terrorism, extremism and radicalisation**

2.2.1 **Terrorism** is defined by the Terrorism Act 2000 as:

“an action that endangers or causes serious violence to a person/people; causes serious damage to property; or seriously interferes with or disrupts an electronic system. The use or threat must be designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public and is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.”

2.2.2 **Extremism** is defined in the national Counter-Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST) as:

“a vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. It also includes calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas.”

2.2.3 **Radicalisation** is defined in the Contest Strategy as:

“the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism.”

2.2.4 There are a range of offences for which people may be charged in relation to terrorism, extremism and radicalisation including:

• murder or soliciting murder;

• committing, preparing or instigating acts of terrorism;

• incitement to commit acts of terrorism overseas;

• encouragement of terrorism;

• inciting racial or religious hatred or hatred because of sexual orientation;

• inviting support for a proscribed organisation;

• terrorist financing offences;

• dissemination of terrorist publications;

• offences of encouragement and dissemination using the internet.

**2.3 Information Sharing**

2.3.1 Effective information sharing is key to the delivery of Prevent, so that partners are able to take appropriately informed action. This will sometimes require the sharing of personal information between partners and is particularly the case when supporting vulnerable people, where the sharing of information will be central to providing the most appropriate support.

2.3.2 Peshkar will ensure that Information Sharing Agreements are in place between Safeguarding officers at the outset of each project. However, the assessment of whether information should be shared needs to be undertaken on a case by case basis.

2.3.3 Peshkar, as a non-public charitable organisation recognises that there may be a need to pass personal and sensitive information to statutory bodies and the approach to information sharing remains the same.

2.3.5 Agencies may consider sharing personal information with each other for Prevent purposes, subject to a case-by-case basis assessment which considers how data protection requirements are met and the proposed sharing being necessary, proportionate and lawful.

2.3.6 In order to ensure that information sharing is necessary, proportionate and lawful, each case needs to be judged on its own merit. The following questions should be considered when sharing information:

* What information are you intending to share?
* With whom are you intending to share the information?
* Why you are intending to share the information (i.e. with what expected outcome)?
* What is the legal basis on which the information is to be shared. For example has the subject consented, or is there a justification such as safeguarding an individual from serious harm or to prevent or detect crime?
* Are individuals aware that the information is being shared?

2.3.7 Any sharing of personal or sensitive personal data must be considered carefully, but this is particularly the case where the consent of the individual is not to be obtained. Where consent is not sought, an assessment of the relevant legislation is required to ensure sharing meets legislative requirements. Once the assessment has been made, the information should be reviewed to consider whether the individual should then be informed. There will be circumstances in which advising the individual will not be possible because it will prejudice delivery of the intended outcome. In such cases there are legal exemptions which permit sharing to take place without informing individuals e.g. the detection of crime.

**3. Prevent and Contest Duties**

**3.1 The Contest Strategy**

3.1.1 The national **CONTEST Strategy** was updated in 2011 and has four strands:

• PURSUE: to stop terrorist attacks;

• PREVENT: to stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism;

• PROTECT: to strengthen our protection against terrorist attack; and

• PREPARE: to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack

3.1.2 The CONTEST strategy reflects the current assessment of terrorist threats and the Government’s revised security and counter-terrorism policies. The strategy covers all forms of terrorism, including the threat to Great Britain from Northern Ireland related terrorism and extreme right-wing terrorism.

3.1.3 Resources will be prioritised according to risk, and the current priority is tackling the threat from Syria, Iraq and Al Qa’ida associated groups. However, terrorists associated with the extreme right wing also pose a continued threat to our safety and security.

3.1.4 International terrorism remains a real threat to the United Kingdom. In August 2014, the Government assessed the threat level from international terrorism as ‘Severe’ meaning that a terrorist attack is highly likely.

3.1.5 The current threat level to the United Kingdom from Northern Ireland-related terrorism is ‘Moderate’ meaning an attack is possible, but not likely.

**3.2 Prevent Duty**

3.2.1 The Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 created a new statutory duty, termed the **Prevent Duty**, for ‘specified authorities’ (including local authorities; further and higher educational establishments; schools; registered childcare providers; NHS Trusts; prisons; probation services; police; and, under-18 secure estates), in the exercise of their functions to have ‘due regard’ to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. This duty came into effect on 1st July 2015. A full list of the specified authorities is given in Schedule 6 of the Act.

3.2.2 In delivering the Prevent Strategy the Government seeks to achieve a balance between security and the protection of civil liberties.

3.2.3 The aim of the Prevent Strategy is to reduce the threat to the UK from terrorism by stopping people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. The Strategy was explicitly changed in 2011 to deal with all forms of terrorism and with non-violent extremism, which can create an atmosphere conducive to terrorism and can popularise views which terrorists can exploit.

3.2.4 The Prevent Strategy has three key objectives (the three “i’s”):

• **Ideology** - Challenging the ideology that supports terrorism and those who promote it;

• **Individuals** – Protect vulnerable people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure they are given appropriate advice and support; and

• **Institutions** – Supporting sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation.

3.2.6 The first objective is challenging the ideology that supports terrorism and those who promote it. Some important considerations are:

• this includes being proactive in promoting values such as: democracy, the rule of law, equality of opportunity, freedom of speech, and the universal right to freedom from persecution;

• there is a need to focus on the few people who are most susceptible to terrorist propaganda. It should not be assumed that Muslims are any more vulnerable to radicalisation than other faith or ethnic groups;

• Prevent needs to involve local communities and organisations. Government cannot suggest any form of faith is appropriate or acceptable.

3.2.7 The second objective is key in relation to this guidance, since it is concerned with protecting vulnerable people. Local safeguarding procedures are a central part of this. Some key points in delivering this are:

• radicalisation is a process not an event, and it is possible to intervene in this to prevent vulnerable people being radicalised;

• there is a need to ensure that activities are proportionate, and focused upon people at risk;

• activity needs to address all forms of terrorism; and

• safeguarding against involvement in terrorism and extremism leading to terrorism is everyone’s responsibility. It is not just the responsibility of the police.

3.2.8 The third objective is supporting sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation. The Strategy highlights that:

• a wide range of sectors can provide routes through which people are radicalised to become terrorists or support terrorism. Priority areas for intervention include: education, faith, health, criminal justice, charities and the internet (which is identified as a key risk which cuts across all sectors);

• Prevent work in schools is key, but needs to be proportionate.;

• in universities and colleges, freedom of speech and academic freedom are key principles, but they also have a legal and moral duty of care for staff and students;

• people with mental health issues or learning disabilities may be vulnerable to radicalisation, and it is important that all staff working in health and social care are aware of possible signs of radicalisation and how to refer people for further support;

• work with young offenders and people vulnerable to offending has a particularly critical role in ensuring the future success of Prevent.

**3.3 The Channel Programme**

3.3.1 The Counter Terrorism and Security Act is intended to secure effective local co-operation and delivery of Channel in all areas. In practice, the legislation requires:

a) Local authorities to ensure that a multi-agency panel exists in their area;

b) The local authority to chair the panel;

c) The panel to develop a support plan for individuals accepted as Channel cases;

d) The panel to consider alternative forms of support, including health and social services, where Channel is not appropriate; and

e) All partners of a panel, so far as appropriate and reasonably practicable, to co-operate with the police and the panel in the carrying out of their functions.

3.3.2 Channel focuses on providing support at an early stage to people who are identified as being vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism, or extremism leading to terrorism. The programme uses a multi-agency approach to protect vulnerable people by:

* Identifying individuals at risk;
* Assessing the nature and extent of that risk; and
* Developing the most appropriate support plan for the individuals concerned.

3.3.3 Channel aims to support vulnerable individuals through targeted intervention relevant to the individual’s vulnerability and risk, to prevent them from committing a criminal act. If it is believed that an individual may already have committed a criminal offence relating to terrorism or extremism they are not appropriate for Channel.

3.3.4 The Channel process ensures that vulnerable children and adults of any faith, ethnicity or background, receive support before their vulnerabilities are exploited by those who would want them to embrace terrorism and before they become involved in criminal terrorist related activity.

3.3.5 Channel assesses vulnerability using a consistently applied vulnerability assessment framework built around three criteria:

• Engagement with a group, cause or ideology;

• Intent to cause harm; and

• Capability to cause harm.

3.3.6 Peshkar is committed to co-operating with all relevant agencies. It is important to recognise that Channel is not about reporting or informing on individuals in order to prosecute them. It is about organisations and communities working together to support vulnerable people at an early stage to prevent them from being radicalised.

3.3.7 Participation in Channel remains voluntary and requires consent to be given by the individual (or their parent/guardian in the case of a child) in advance of support measures being put into place. All individuals who receive support through Channel must be made aware that they are receiving this as part of a programme to protect people from being drawn into terrorism, what the aims of the process are and what to expect. Where someone does not wish to continue with the process, it may be appropriate to provide alternative support through other mainstream services, such as children’s or adults’ social care services.

**4. Procedures**

**4.1 Why might you be concerned and what might you notice?**

4.1.1 Most individuals do not become terrorists, nor become radicalised to support terrorism or ideologies which can lead to terrorism. Numerous factors can contribute to and influence the risk of radicalisation. When undertaking any assessment where there may be concerns about radicalisation, it is important to:

• consider the vulnerability indicators when undertaking the assessment and what this means as part of the person’s wider needs;

• understand and identify the factors that build resilience and potentially protect individuals from becoming radicalised or getting involved in terrorism; and

• be cautious in assessing these factors to avoid inappropriately labelling or stigmatising individuals because they possess a characteristic or fit a specific profile.

4.1.2 It is suggested that several factors come together in the process of radicalisation and could possibly present themselves in one or more of the following ways:

* an individual evidences support for terrorist or extremist activity and/or is expressing a desire to participate in such activity;
* an individual is exposed to radicalising influences, either through social networks, or by accessing information on the internet;
* an individual seeks answers about their identity, particularly in relation to cultural and religious heritage: identity; faith; and, belonging;
* an individual expresses frustration, resentment or anger, because of how they feel or because they feel that people with whom they identify, have been treated unfairly, persecuted, humiliated or discriminated against.
* There are also factors which reduce the resilience of individuals to the risk of radicalisation (for example the absence of supportive family relationships.

**4.2 Check your concerns**

4.2.1 If the concern relates to the person or public being in immediate danger or at risk from harm, then the Police should be contacted immediately.

4.2.2 Unless there is a reason not to do so, professionals working with an individual about whom there are concerns should initially check them with the individual and/or their parent/guardian in order to ascertain the facts prior to submitting a Channel referral. Information received from speaking to the individual and or parent/guardian might possibly mitigate the need for a referral.

4.2.3 Concerns should not be checked with the parent/guardian if they are considered to be the source of risk.

4.2.4 Frontline workers having contact with the public should have an awareness of the indicators which might be visible during the radicalisation process. All concerns should be reported directly to the Designated Safeguarding Lead who will undertake the Channel process if deemed appropriate.

**4.3 Sharing your concerns**

4.3.1 As with other safeguarding issues, if the worker is concerned that the person or their family may be at risk, then that concern should in the first instance be shared with the organisation’s safeguarding lead/Prevent Single Point of Contact (SPOC).

4.3.2 If the concerns about an individual are not serious, the safeguarding lead / Prevent SPOC may decide that appropriate action can be taken within the organisation to address the issue. Once the action has been undertaken, a review should be undertaken to assess whether the concern still remains.

4.3.3 The flow chart below shows the process for safeguarding individuals within an organisation



4.3.4 Initial concerns raised about an individual will, in many instances, be appropriately managed internally within the organisation without the need for multi-agency intervention. However, if a multi-agency response is considered necessary, then a referral detailing the concerns should be shared with the Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hub (MASH)- details of these contacts will be found in the central Safeguarding policy.

**4.4 Making a referral**

4.4.1 The individual within Silhouette Youth with responsibility for Prevent referrals is [insert name].

4.4.2 The safeguarding lead/Prevent SPOC will offer advice and guidance about the appropriateness of making a referral and gather additional information to help understand the issue.

4.4.3 If necessary, the safeguarding lead/Prevent SPOC will have an initial discussion with the local authority Prevent lead in advance of a referral being submitted.

4.4.4 In the event that the safeguarding lead / Prevent SPOC believe that the concerns relating to an individual are more significant and require a multi-agency response, a completed assessment form must be emailed in the first instance to the relevant safeguarding team as follows:

• Children: [enter contact email]

• Adults: [enter contact email]

4.4.5 There is an on-line safeguarding referral form at: [enter web address]

The Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hub can be contacted during working hours.

4.4.5 All telephone referrals resulting in the requirement for a multi-agency response must be followed up in writing. Where an assessment has already been undertaken (e.g. Early Help assessment) this may be used instead, providing that all the relevant information has been collected.